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ABSTRACT
The proliferation of network-connected devices and applica-
tions has resulted in people receiving dozens, or hundreds, of
notifications per day. When people are in the presence of oth-
ers, each notification poses some risk of accidental information
disclosure; onlookers may see notifications appear above the
lock screen of a mobile phone, on the periphery of a desktop
or laptop display, or projected onscreen during a presentation.
In this paper, we quantify the prevalence of these accidental
disclosures in the context of email notifications, and we study
people’s relevant preferences and concerns. Our results are
compiled from an exploratory retrospective survey of 131 re-
spondents, and a separate contextual-labeling study in which
169 participants labeled 1,040 meeting-email pairs. We find
that, for 53% of people, at least 1 in 10 email notifications
poses an information disclosure risk. We also find that the real
or perceived severity of these risks depend both on user charac-
teristics and attributes of the meeting or email (e.g. the number
of recipients or attendees). We conclude by exploring machine
learning algorithms to predict people’s comfort levels given
an email notification and a context, then we present implica-
tions for the design of future contextually-relevant notification
systems.
Author Keywords
Notifications, information disclosure, privacy, virtual
assistants
INTRODUCTION
Estimates suggest that people receive dozens, or hundreds, of
notification messages per day [31, 30, 21] delivered to a range
of connected devices that people carry with them, or that are
ever-present in the environment (e.g., wearables, smartphones,
computers or – increasingly – internet of things devices). Ex-
tensive prior research has explored the productivity costs of
mal-timed notifications [13, 21, 20], but little is known about
the privacy cost of such messages; people are frequently in
the presence of others when notifications arrive, and, in these
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Dear                         , We regret to inform 
you that your submission to UIST’16 was
(a) (b)
Figure 1. An example of an email notification on an iPhone (a) and on
a computer running the Windows 10 operating system (b). The noti-
fication reveals the email’s sender, subject, and first sentence from the
message body. When in the presence of others (e.g, during meetings),
users may be uncomfortable receiving notifications and revealing these
data to onlookers.
contexts, each notification poses some risk of accidental in-
formation disclosure. For example, email notifications often
reveal the sender and subject fields of messages, and may be
visible above the lock screen of a mobile phone (Figure 1a),
on the periphery of a co-located desktop or laptop (Figure 1b),
on a projection screen during a presentation, or on a smart TV
[37]. As Susan Farrell writes in [9]:
"By making smart devices ubiquitous, we’ve exposed
ourselves to computer-assisted embarrassment. We must
expand our usability methods to cover not only the iso-
lated user in one context of use, but also the social user,
who interacts with the system in the presence of others."
To mitigate the potential privacy costs of notifications, current
operating systems or applications provide limited notification
strategies that offer either binary control (e.g. turning on and
off notifications) or minimal information level control (e.g.
whether or not to show previews). Using the binary control
strategy, users have to make trade-offs between minimizing
the privacy risks in accidental information disclosure by sup-
pressing notifications at the cost of losing timely access to
potentially important, or time-critical, information. Using
the minimal information level control strategy, although users
have some control over the level of information that is being
disclosed, they are unnecessarily bound to one solution for all
notifications regardless of their contexts and the contents of
the notifications. For example, if a user is expecting certain
emails pertaining to their current meeting, the user may wish
to know when those emails arrive (by indicating either sender
and/or the preview of the email), but may not want to disclose
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the sender or the preview of other emails (e.g. shipping details,
emails from their doctors).
With the ultimate goal of designing more contextually-relevant
notification strategies to provide sufficient information while
still preserving user privacy, as a first step, we sought to un-
derstand the information disclosure risks arising from notifi-
cations received when people are in the presence of others.
Specifically, we ask the following research questions:
• RQ1: How often do email notifications pose an information
disclosure risk? I.e., How often are emails received while
in the presence of others, and how often do these emails
contain sensitive information?
• RQ2: To what degree are people’s preferences and concerns
dependent on user characteristics (personal preferences, job
role, etc.) versus being context-dependent with respect to
the content disclosed by the notification, and the people in
the room?
• RQ3: To what degree can a machine-learned system antici-
pate information disclosure risks? If such predictions are
possible, what features are important?
To answer RQ1 and RQ2, we conducted two studies in an
enterprise environment grounded in the scenario of a person
receiving an email notification on their notification-capable de-
vices while attending a meeting. We focus on emails because
they are the primary source of notifications in this environment:
86% of professionals cite email as their primary means of com-
munication, and an average 112.5 billion business emails were
exchanged per day in 2015 [14]. Moreover, email often carries
notifications for other services (Twitter, Facebook, Slack), sug-
gesting that our findings are likely to provide insights about
notifications generated by other communication platforms.
We first conducted an exploratory retrospective online survey
(N=131) to ask respondents to reflect on recent emails and
meetings. From this survey we gained an initial understand-
ing about the existence and the prevalence of the accidental
information disclosure problem, and we learned the factors
affecting subjects’ preferences and mitigation strategies cur-
rently used in practice. The exploratory study also allowed a
broad scope by asking respondents about both personal and
work inboxes and contexts, and allowed respondents to provide
rich open-ended responses detailing the reasons behind their
stated comfortable levels. Findings from this study guided
our design decisions for the second study, which provides a
deeper, data-centric investigation into information disclosure
risks in enterprise settings. For example, it helped us decide
which types of features to extract, which survey questions to
ask, and which measures or scales to use.
Based on the insights we gained from the exploratory on-
line survey, we conducted a contextual data collection study
(N=169), which employed a custom-built labeling tool, to
collect labels and preferences for email-meeting pairs. The la-
beling tool integrated directly with participants’ email and cal-
endaring accounts, allowing the tool to systematically identify
emails that were actually received during meetings, focusing
labeling on non-hypothetical cases. For each email-meeting
pair, the tool automatically extracts features summarizing high-
level characteristics of the user, the content of the email mes-
sage, and the properties of the meeting; and, it does so in a
manner that maintains participant anonymity.
Finally, to answer RQ3, we leverage the data collected by the
aforementioned contextual labeling tool to explore feature sets
and machine learning algorithms to predict information dis-
closure risks. Here we explore: (a) features that are associated
with users (e.g. job title, depth in an organizational chart, the
average number of emails received during meetings); (b) fea-
tures that describe a particular email message (e.g. number of
recipients in an email, categorization of email body); and (c)
features that describe a meeting instance, such as whether or
not a manager is present, or the number of external members
in a meeting.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: We review
related work, then discuss the findings of the retrospective
survey. We describe the second study, which involved the de-
ployment of a custom contextual-labeling tool, then describe
relevant findings. Finally, we explore machine learning al-
gorithms to predict people’s comfort levels, and we present
implications for the design of future social-context aware noti-
fication systems.
RELATED WORK
Productivity Cost in Notifications
Previous works in notifications mainly focused on the negative
impact of interruptions on productivity by quantifying the
cost of interruptions and identifying low-cost interruptible
moments to send notifications. Previous studies show that the
cognitive load of current tasks [5, 20], activity transitions [16,
11], physical activities and user interactions on devices [27],
and other context such as time and location [29] can be used
to identify interruptible moments for notifications. In desktop
office settings, Fogarty et al. [13] show how sensor-based
statistical models can be used to predict one’s interruptibility
by leveraging features such as: phone use, ambient noise
(e.g., to detect in-person conversations), mouse movement,
and keyboard keystrokes. Likewise, COORDINATE [18]
uses computer activity, calendar information, audio and video
signals, and indoor and outdoor location data to predict users’
availability. Notification policies then use inferred levels of
availability and interruptibility to determine the right time to
deliver notifications to users. While these systems demonstrate
how systems can avoid interrupting users at inopportune times,
research has also recognized that there can be costs associated
with delaying notifications. As such, notification policies
should trade-off the cost of interruption with the cost of delays
[17, 19].
Our work is distinguished in that we study the privacy cost
associated with notifications that disclose some information
in social settings, as opposed to most of the previous works
focusing on the loss of productivity (e.g. interrupting an im-
portant conversation or tasks). The sensitive nature of the
problem we study has implications for our methodology for
data collection, in which we have taken careful steps to respect
respondents’ privacy in both study 1 and 2.
Privacy Cost in Notifications
Privacy Attitudes and Behaviors
A first step in understanding the potential privacy cost of ill-
timed notifications is to understand people’s general attitudes
towards privacy. Pioneering work in this space includes the
Westin Privacy Segmentation Index [38], that categorizes
people into three groups: privacy fundamentalist, marginally
concerned, and pragmatist. Privacy fundamentalists are those
who are very concerned about their privacy and very reluctant
to share any of their information. Marginally concerned are, as
the name implies, those who are marginally concerned about
their privacy, and are generally willing to share details or data
about themselves. Privacy pragmatists are people who are
somewhat concerned about their privacy, but are willing to
compromise some privacy for convenience.
Numerous follow-up studies have adopted these definitions
[1, 3, 28, 2] to describe general privacy attitudes, but have
nonetheless reported finding complex interactions between
the types of disclosures, and the audiences who bear witness.
For example, [1] shows that people are generally comfortable
sharing their favorite TV shows, favorite snacks, and even
email addresses with websites, but are much less comfortable
when there is a chance that the website could share the infor-
mation with others in an identifiable way, or if the information
were instead provided by a child under their care. Likewise,
Olson et al. show that, even among one’s trusted inner cir-
cles, one’s willingness to disclose information varies greatly
depending on the nature of the information being shared [28].
For example, respondents were often uncomfortable disclos-
ing work-related documents with family members, or health
information (e.g., pregnancy status) with co-workers.
Adding to this complex motif, past work has also found that
privacy attitudes are not always correlated with intended and
actual behaviors [26, 33, 2]. For example, [33] found that the
participants’ actual behavior in an online shopping scenario
was different from their self-reported privacy preferences. [4]
found that the general privacy attitude was a poor predictor of
whether participants would share their location information
with other people. Like privacy attitudes, privacy behaviors
are context-specific [4, 12, 39] and multi-dimensional [23].
In this paper we recognize the potential for these complex
context-dependent attitudes and behaviors. We designed both
of our studies to collect a multitude of signals that characterize
how information, audiences, and contexts interact with one
another to create situations in which people are uncomfortable
(or comfortable) receiving notifications. Additionally, we
designed our second study such that it grounds data collection
on specific historical instances in which people are known
to have received notifications while in the presence of others,
rather than asking people about general scenarios and attitudes.
Difference in Information Disclosure and Privacy Management
Strategies
In addition to understanding privacy attitudes in a broader con-
text, it is also important to understand how notifications may
differ from the scenarios explored in past work. In particular,
much of the prior work has examined intentional sharing of in-
formation with websites or social networking services (SNSs)
[35, 2, 3, 36]. Granted that when people disclose their infor-
mation to these services they don’t have perfect knowledge of
the consequences, with few exceptions, they have agency in
deciding which information to disclose. In particular, people
often perform an informal risk-benefit analysis when deciding
to take action that may have privacy implications [6, 25, 7,
39]. People also use this agency to enact preventive strategies,
including self-censoring, managing access control groups, and
taking actions to conceal their identity [24, 36]. In the con-
text of ‘shoulder surfing’ [8], recent work also introduced
other preventive strategies that can help protect user privacy
by detecting onlookers and providing awareness through alerts
[40].
In contrast, this level of agency and control is not available
in cases where people receive push notifications. Instead, the
push notification scenario bears some resemblance to the sce-
nario in which people are tagged in photos shared to SNSs
without consent. In such cases, the users of SNSs can of-
ten take corrective actions by either untagging the photos or
deleting the contents before more people see the posts [24].
With push notifications, disclosures are instantaneous, and it
is unclear what corrective actions can be taken after the event.
Most closely related to our work on accidental information
disclosure in notifications is accidental information disclosure
in web browsing activities in the presence of other people [15]
and receiving notifications while watching videos together on
a smart TV [37]. In [15], through a survey of 155 participants,
and with three distinct hypothetical web browsing scenarios
(i.e., embarrassing, neutral, positive), researchers assessed par-
ticipants’ comfort level in the presence of different groups of
viewers. People’s comfort level is higher when the viewers
are spouses or close friends, and lower with colleagues and
supervisors. Also, the comfort level is related to the level of
control the participants have (e.g., whether the participants are
having control over the mouse and keyboard). In [37], through
a survey of 167 participants, researchers assessed the comfort
level in different notification variants when people are watch-
ing videos on a smart TV with others. The results show that
people’s comfort level is higher when the notification reveals
less information (e.g. notification indicators), and the comfort
level decreases as the notification reveals more information.
In this work, we consider a richer set of contexts (e.g. meeting
type or location, social structure of people in the room, number
of people in the room, etc) that may be indicative of comfort
level in accidental information disclosure.
Common themes to the above-mentioned research are that
one’s level of agency/control and the available mitigation
strategies, in addition to audience and information types,
strongly influence people’s comfort levels. As a part of our
exploratory study (Study 1), we sought to extend our under-
standing of the strategies that people employ to mitigate the
risks of accidental information disclosure arising from push
notifications. In the next section, we briefly review some of
the technological controls currently available in the market.
Limitations and Trade-offs in Existing Notification Strategies
Existing mobile devices and applications’ notification strate-
gies are limited in that they allow users to manage notifications
either with binary control (e.g. turning on and off notifications)
or minimal information level control (e.g. whether or not to
show previews). Although binary control strategies enable
users to turn off notifications entirely to avoid accidental infor-
mation disclosure, users miss the convenience and benefits of
receiving information via notifications, instead requiring user
to continuously monitor their applications for new informa-
tion. This means that users have to make trade-offs between
minimizing the privacy risks in accidental information disclo-
sure by suppressing notifications at the cost of losing timely
access to potentially important, or time-critical, information.
Minimal information level control strategies give users some
control over information being revealed in the notifications ei-
ther showing the previews or just a notification indicator (e.g.,
“You have a new message”)1, but it ineffectively enacts one
solution to all notifications without taking into consideration
user contexts and notification contents.
As we have more and more internet-connected devices and
services that are capable of sending timely, useful and relevant
information via notifications, there is a need to better under-
stand the preferences and concerns about accidental informa-
tion disclosures resulting from these notifications. Likewise,
there is a need to explore designs and notification strategies
that can adapt to the user’s context, as well as to the content
of the notifications.
STUDY #1: EXPLORATORY RETROSPECTIVE SURVEY
As a first step, we describe the results of an exploratory retro-
spective survey which was designed to gain our initial under-
standing of the following: (1) how often notifications pose an
information disclosure risk? (2) How do features of the notifi-
cations, meetings and individuals contribute to the perceived
risk? And, (3) what mitigation strategies do people currently
employ. As noted in the introduction, the methods employed
here allow a broad investigation covering numerous contexts
(e.g., personal vs. work, email topics and themes, etc.)
Procedure
The survey began by collecting basic demographic information
including education, job role, age, gender, notification-capable
device use, average number of meetings in a day. It then
asked participants to answer questions about a notification
scenario, which was evolved slowly over several sections of
the questionnaire, as follows:
1. Respondents were first asked to consider their most recent
meeting. Respondents answered questions about their role
in the meeting, their relation to each of the meeting’s at-
tendees, and the meeting’s time and location, and the types
of notification-capable devices that were present (including
Desktop PC, Laptop, Smartphone, Smartwatch, and Smart
speaker).
2. The survey then asked respondents to open their primary
work email inbox, consider their 10 most recent emails
(excluding the survey invitation), and imagine a scenario
1Some applications (e.g., WhatsApp) and mobile devices (e.g.,
iPhone X) started using notification indicators as a default notifi-
cation setting.
in which they received notifications for those emails dur-
ing the aforementioned meeting. Respondents were asked
about the age of the 10th email.2 Furthermore, we asked
participants to imagine that their notification-capable de-
vices’ screens were visible to meeting attendees, and answer
how many email notifications (out of the ten emails) they
would have been uncomfortable sharing with the people
in the room. We refer to this scenario as a hypothetical
information disclosure event, or HIDE.
3. The questions above were then repeated for the 10 most
recent emails in respondents’ personal email inboxes.
4. Respondents were then asked to select one email (could be
from either work or personal email inbox), if applicable,
that they would have been most uncomfortable receiving in
the scenario outlined above. We refer to this email as the
HIDE email. Respondents were asked to rate their comfort
level in sharing the HIDE email notification with the people
in the room with a 5-point Likert scale (1: Very uncomfort-
able, 5: Very comfortable). Respondents then were asked
to describe general features of the HIDE email, including
their relation to its sender, the number of recipients, the type
of the inbox (work or personal), the type of content con-
tained therein, and to explain, in broad terms, why receiving
notifications for this email would be uncomfortable.
5. Finally, respondents were asked to detail the mitigation
strategies they employ to minimize the information disclo-
sure risks presented by email notifications.
The survey was deployed by emailing a random sample of
800 employees within a large IT corporation. There were 21
email delivery failures, for various technical reasons, resulting
in 779 individuals successfully receiving the invitation. We
describe our findings next.
Results
Participants
We received 118 completed, and 13 partially completed re-
sponses (response rate = 17%, completion rate = 90%). Of the
131 total respondents, 85 were male (65%), 44 were female
(34%), 2 preferred not to answer. Ages were distributed as
follows: 18 – 24 years old (5%), 25 – 34 (24%), 35 – 44 (31%),
45 – 54 (27%), 55 – 64 (8%), ≥ 65 (2%), and 2% declined to
answer.
Participants reported occupying a diverse set of job roles in-
cluding: program managers (28%), software developers (19%),
marketing and sales people (8%), and IT support staff (8%).
The remaining 49 individuals (37%) worked in diverse roles
such as administrative assistants, data scientists, designers,
attorneys or other roles in the legal department, and human
resources.
2We decided to only rely on a respondent’s 10 most recent emails
to (a) convey a simple and consistent sampling criteria in the retro-
spective survey, and (b) minimize response and counting errors by
allowing respondents to observe their emails within a single window
pane (the decision made after pilot testing). To partially compensate
for this limitation, we additionally asked the age of 10th email, which
enables us to calculate the incoming email rate.
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Figure 2. Cumulative distribution of the number of work (red, solid) and
personal (green, dotted) emails that people felt uncomfortable sharing
with meeting attendees.
Prevalence of the information disclosure risk
One key finding from the retrospective survey, and a partial
answer to our first research question, is that the majority of
respondents (53.4%) reported that at least one of their ten most
recent work emails would have resulted in an uncomfortable
disclosure of information (i.e. they selected a comfort rating of
< 3 on the 5-point Likert scale for sharing the sender, subject,
and first sentence of the email) had the email arrived during
their most recent meeting. This increases significantly to
73.3% when respondents were asked to consider the ten most
recent emails delivered to their personal accounts (two tailed
difference of proportions test, p << 0.001, Z = 3.33). While
these findings demonstrate the potential for risk, we cannot
be sure how many emails were actually received during the
meetings. We address this limitation in the second study.
Three groups of respondents
Figure 2 extends the above analysis by presenting the cumula-
tive distribution for work emails (red) and for personal emails
(green) that participants indicated they would be uncomfort-
able receiving in their most recent meeting. There are two
notable features of these distributions: first, there is a sharp
rise at x = 10 emails, with 17% of respondents noting they
would be uncomfortable receiving any work email notification
in the presence of others. This increases to 40% for personal
emails. We also note that the y-intercepts of the two curves
are rather high: 47% of respondents reported that none of their
ten most recent work emails were sensitive. This decreases
to 25% for personal emails. The remaining 36% and 35% of
respondents were more selective, and reported that some of
their work and personal emails were sensitive, respectively.
On the surface, these three groups bear some resemblance to
Westin’s three categories, but we are sensitive to the fact that
privacy concerns are complex and multidimensional. The re-
sponses we collected may be dependant on user characteristics
(e.g. personal preferences, the nature of their occupation), con-
tents in the notifications, and the contexts and their relationship
with the people in the meeting. For example, one participant
explained that she was uncomfortable sharing the information
in notifications due to the nature of her occupation:
“I deal with a lot of privileged and confidential informa-
tion on an hourly, daily basis. I am not able to share the
information and it should not be visible to others.”–P122
We could also see that some of the respondents are less con-
cerned about the email notifications divulging information
because they personally are less concerned about the contents
of notifications being shared with the other people in the room.
As P81 reported:
“...But I’m generally not embarrassed by who and what I
am. Plus, humor is a good way to diffuse why I get the
spam I get.”
Also, worth noting that the floor and ceiling effects we observe
may simply reflect limitations in our ability to sample the
most/least sensitive contexts, contents, and emails for some
users. Our second study will use more sophisticated sampling
method to address such limitations.
To sum up, the distribution of responses indicate the three
distinct groups of respondents. While some of the open-ended
survey responses – like the ones above – highlight the rela-
tionship between respondents’ occupation, personality and
demographics [32] on notification preferences, some indicate
that their preferences depend on the context. To understand
this relationship, in the next sections, we extend the analysis
by examining the content disclosed by notifications, and the
people attending the meeting.
Notification fields and their content
Given prior research [28], we suspect that one’s comfort level
depends both on the types of information disclosed by notifica-
tions, and on the audience witnessing the disclosure. Address-
ing the former, participants were asked to select one email
that they would have been uncomfortable sharing in their most
recent meeting from among their 10 most recent emails. As
noted earlier, we refer to this as a hypothetical information
disclosure event (HIDE). Participants were asked to answer
questions about their HIDE emails, and to describe, in their
own words, the types of information that rendered a notifica-
tion sensitive. We limit the remaining discussion to the 62
respondents (47%) who both identified a HIDE email, and who
fully completed this portion of the survey questionnaire. We
describe the general properties of HIDE emails, then analyze
open-ended responses.
In most cases (72.6%), respondents elected to describe HIDE
emails that were delivered to their work email inboxes – per-
haps reflecting that the survey invitation was sent during busi-
ness hours. Among these emails, most were sent by work
colleagues (75.6%), including: direct superiors (15.6%), team
members (28.9%), and other members of the organization
(28.9%). Conversely, external senders included: clients or
customers (8.9%), family and friends (4.4%), and one in-
stance each from a doctor, and from an insurance company.
Conversely, when HIDE emails were delivered to personal
inboxes, most were from friends and family (76.5%), but also
included messages from: doctors, banking institutions and
external recruiters.
In the majority of cases (62.9%) respondents were the only
recipient of their HIDE emails – though there were 11 cases
(12.9%) where the email was sent to 5 or more people (via
the to: or cc: lines). This finding agrees with the intuition
that emails sent only to one person are, perhaps, more likely
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Figure 3. Distribution of respondent comfort levels for sharing different
fields included in typical email notifications for HIDE emails.
to contain private information. We explore this hypothesis
further in the second part of this paper.
As noted above, we asked participants to describe, in broad
terms, what types of information rendered these emails sensi-
tive. Open-ended responses were analyzed, and themes iden-
tified, following open coding practices [22]. Among the top
themes were: unspecified personal life details (14 instances),
unspecified confidential work documents (11 instances), de-
tails of ongoing projects (10 instances), health information (7
instances), personal successes or failures (7 instances), finan-
cial communications (4 instances), and messages that mention
people attending the meeting (3 instances). These themes
largely overlap those identified by Olson et al. in [28].
As email notifications can reveal numerous email fields (Fig-
ure 1) including: sender, subject, and the first sentence of the
email body, we asked participants to rate how comfortable
would they have been if the people in the room saw the dif-
ferent email fields. Each field-type reveals a different class
of information, and, to varying degrees, poses an information
disclosure risk. For example, the sender field reveals that a
respondent is in correspondence with a particular individual,
while the subject reveals the topic of discussion. Correspond-
ingly, among HIDE emails 25% of survey respondents were
comfortable with email notifications that revealed the sender’s
identity, while only 3.6% were comfortable with notifications
that reveal the email subject. This difference is highly statis-
tically significant (p = 0.001, Z = 3.20). Figure 3 provides
further details, breaking down respondent comfort levels by
field-type.
Audience features
We also explored whether meeting properties (e.g., location,
attendance, etc.) impacted the proportion of respondents who
identified a HIDE email from among their 10 most recent mes-
sages. Though this analysis revealed no statistically significant
results, we present our findings to: (1) characterize the meet-
ings our respondents attend, (2) offer points of comparison
with the results from our second study, and (3) to identify
weak trends that may yet become features in machine-learned
models.
The majority of respondents reported that their most recent
meeting occurred in a conference room (52.7%), though peo-
Figure 4. Proportion of respondents reporting HIDE emails, partitioned
by the number of people attending the meeting (left) and the attendees’
relationships to the respondent (right). Error bars show standard error;
none of the pairwise differences are statistically significant at the α =
0.05 level.
ple also reported hosting meetings in their own offices (22.9%),
attending meetings in someone else’s office (15.3%), and at-
tending meetings in other common spaces such as a lounge or
atrium (8.4%). Among respondents whose meetings occurred
in conference rooms, 50.7% were able to identify an email
they would have been uncomfortable receiving in that con-
text. Likewise, among respondents meeting in offices, 46.6%
were able to identify such an email. These differences are not
statistically significant (p= 0.61, Z = 0.509).
When asked how many people attended the respondent’s most
recent meeting, the mode response was “5 – 10 other people”
(35.1%). Other response categories included: “2-4 other peo-
ple” (32.8%), “10 or more people” (14.5%), and “1:1 meetings”
(12.2%). Again, we examine the proportion of respondents
who were able to identify an email they would have been
uncomfortable receiving in each of these contexts. This pro-
portion monotonically increases with the size of the meeting
(Figure 4, left), but the pairwise differences are not significant.
Finally, we report that meetings were attended by team mem-
bers (65.6%), direct superiors (41.2%), other members of the
respondent’s organization (51.1%), as well as people external
to the organization (17.6%). In each case, we examine the
proportion of respondents who were able to identify an email
they would have been uncomfortable receiving in the meeting.
Figure 4 (right) shows that the proportion increases as the
meeting’s attendee list grows beyond one’s own team. Though
this agrees with intuition, the differences are not statistically
significant. We revisit this observation later in this paper.
Current mitigation strategies
We asked respondents to detail any mitigation strategies they
employ on mobile devices, as well as on laptop or desktop
computers, to minimize the information disclosure risks asso-
ciated with ill-timed email notifications.
On desktop or laptop computers, the most common mitigation
strategy was to disable all notifications in software, e.g., by
closing applications (67 instances), or by explicitly enabling
the “do not disturb” feature (53 instances). This highlights
the limitation of binary control strategies in suppressing no-
tifications for user privacy at the cost of losing timely access
Meeting
Subject: 1:1 Weekly Meetings
From 8/16/2017 11am till 8/16/2017 12pm at           ’s Office (Organized by              )
Attendees:
              ,
Email
To:
Subject: your talk topic for Aug 31st
Body: Hi,
You are scheduled to give a talk on August 31st. 
Could you please send me a title and a couple 
sentences about your talk topic before 8/24?
We have 3 speakers slotted for this lunch, so talks 
should be about 15min.
Thanks!
From:  
Survey questions
Question 1:  Did you attend the meeting above?
Question 2:  While attending the meeting, were there other people in the same room as you?
Question 3:  How comfortable would you have been if the people in the room noticed new email indicator (e.g. 
banner icons, “You have a new email”)?
Question 4:  How comfortable would you have been if the people in the room saw the sender of the email?
Question 5:  How comfortable would you have been if the people in the room saw the subject of the email?
Question 6:  How comfortable would you have been if the people in the room saw the first sentence of the 
email?
a
b c
Figure 5. Contextual labeling interface for survey questions about various email-meeting pairs. (a) Meeting pane that shows a randomly chosen meeting,
time and location of the meeting, attendees, and subject of the meeting; (b) Email pane that shows a randomly chosen email that was received during
the meeting, the sender, recipients, subject, and body of the email; (c) survey questions about their comfort level in sharing different fields of the email,
type of the email, preferences for different devices and disclosure level.
to potentially important information. Conversely, on mobile
phones respondents were most likely to report physical mit-
igation strategies such as keeping their phones in a pocket
(63 instances), or flipping the device face down so that its
screen was not visible to the people in the room (53 instances).
These physical mitigation strategies mimic minimal informa-
tion level control strategies as an audio or a vibrotactile cue
will be served as a notification indicator and notifications
would continue to be perceived by the respondent.
In summary, results from the exploratory retrospective survey
provide a key set of initial insights about the prevalence of
the information disclosure risks posed by notifications, and
about how email topics and fields may contribute to this risk.
Moreover, we found that respondents could be clustered into
three distinct groups based on the proportion of emails they
received that would result in uncomfortable notifications.
While the survey was designed to ground responses in re-
spondents’ actual emails and meetings, it is limited in two
important ways. First, to convey a simple and consistent sam-
pling criteria and to minimize response or counting errors,
the survey asked respondents to comment only on a single
meeting, and on their single most-sensitive email. Second, it
asked respondents to consider hypothetical situations in which
they receive the most-sensitive email during the most recent
meeting. Together, these survey design choices limit our abil-
ity to measure actual incidence rates, and to model the overall
distribution of risk. To address these limitations, we developed
and deployed a custom-built contextual labeling tool, which
we describe in the next section.
STUDY #2: CONTEXTUAL LABELING STUDY
Based on the insights we gained from the exploratory retro-
spective study, we developed and deployed a tool (Figure 5) to
extract various features and collect labelled data for learning
a context-dependent predictive model of disclosure risk. The
tool allows participants to: view emails that they received dur-
ing meetings, view the details of those meetings, and rate their
comfort-levels in receiving the corresponding email notifica-
tion in that context. We described the procedure, apparatus,
and results below.
Procedure and Apparatus
The contextual-labeling study was deployed within the same
large information technology company as the initial retrospec-
tive survey. Participants shared a common computing environ-
ment. In particular, they stored their emails and calendars in a
common email and calendar web service. This homogeneous
environment greatly simplified the administration of the study,
and the implementation of the tool.
Procedure
Participants were recruited by emailing a random sample of
4000 employees, distinct from the 800 who were contacted for
the retrospective survey. The invitation email described the
study’s purpose and procedure, and provided sufficient infor-
mation to validate the authenticity of the invitation (e.g., links
to internal systems and pages documenting the experiment,
and the results of both an internal review process, and IRB
review). Crucially, the invitation also included a link to the
web application that hosted the labeling tool.
Upon navigating to the web application, participants were first
shown the purpose of the study (i.e. characterizing people’s
preferences about information disclosed by desktop and mo-
bile notifications that arrive when the intended recipient is in
the presence of others). Then, participants were asked to au-
thenticate to the tool using their corporate credentials, and to
grant the tool time-limited access to their corporate email and
calendaring accounts. Once participants were authenticated,
they were presented with a brief tutorial of the labeling tool,
and its three regions:
• The top region (Figure 5a) displayed a recent meeting,
randomly selected from a day. Visible fields included:
meeting subject, time, location, organizer, and a list of
attendees.
• The left region (Figure 5b), displayed a randomly selected
email that arrived during the meeting. Visible fields
included: the sender, recipient list (the ‘to:’ and ‘cc:’ lines),
subject, and email body.
• The right region (Figure 5c) contained a short survey, where
participants could provide labels and answer questions
about the email-meeting pair. Questions asked about partici-
pants’ comfort levels in having notifications disclose various
fields of the email to the people attending the meeting.
To collect data across a wide range of email-meeting pairs, the
tool samples one email-meeting pair per day, moving back-
ward in history one day at a time until 10 pairs are labeled. In
each day, a meeting was randomly selected and then an email
that was received during the meeting was randomly selected
as well. If participants indicated that they did not attend a
scheduled meeting, or that the meeting was conducted via
teleconference, the tool selected another email-meeting pair
for labeling.
Upon inputting labels for 10 email-meeting pairs, participants
were presented with a debriefing page, and an optional invita-
tion to take part in a raffle for one of three $50 Amazon.com
gift cards. This sweepstakes was conducted in appreciation
for their participation.
In addition to collecting user-provided labels and preferences,
the labeling tool collected high-level features of the emails
and meetings (Table 1). Importantly, the study was conducted
completely anonymously: users were assigned random session
identifiers, the participation sweepstakes was conducted on a
separate unconnected system, and the features were chosen to
be non-personally identifiable. We provide more details about
these features in the next section.
Feature Extraction
Table 1 presents a list of features automatically collected by
the labeling tool. Features are broadly categorized into three
groups. User features are those that are associated with the
participant, but not with a particular email-meeting pair. For
example, this class includes the average number of emails
a person received during meetings in the past 7 days, their
depth in the organization chart, and their job title. To preserve
Feature Description
U
se
r
jobTitle k-anonymized job title
orgDepth depth in the organizational chart
numEmails number of emails received in the past week
numMeetings number of meetings scheduled in the past week
avgEmlPerMtg average number of emails received in meetings
numMtgWithEml number of meetings interrupted by emails
E
m
ai
l
numRecipients number of recipients in the email
numDistList number of distribution lists as the recipient
numThreads number of threads in the email
isAutogenerated is autogenerated email
numPplMentioned number of attendees mentioned in the email
numAttachment number of attachments
attachment[type] type of attachment in the email
isSenderInternal is the sender internal to the organization
numSubjectWords number of words in the email subject
numBodyWords number of words in the email body
entity[type] mentions of people, locations and organizations
LIWC[cat] feature vector over email body
M
ee
tin
g
location meeting location
numAttendees number of people attending the meeting
isManagerPresent is the person’s manager present
numDirectReports number of direct reports present
numOrgAbove number of attendees above in the org chart
numOrgBelow number of attendees blow in the org chart
numExternal number of attendees external to organization
numSubjectWords number of words in the meeting subject
numBodyWords number of words in the meeting body
LIWC[cat] feature vector over meeting body
Table 1. A list of user, email and meeting features that the labeling tool
automatically computed for each email-meeting pair labeled by partici-
pants.
anonymity, we used k-anonymization (k = 50) at the organi-
zational level for full job titles, and separately, for job-title
bigrams. Email features are those that describe a particular
email message. Examples of these features include the number
of recipients, Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC, [34])
feature vectors, mentions of people, locations, and organiza-
tions, and whether the email is machine-generated. For LIWC
categories, we tokenized the body, categorized each token
into the pre-defined psychological and linguistic categories
in LIWC, then computed the percentage of tokens in each
category relative to the email body as a whole. We also used
the Stanford named entity recognizer [10] to detect mentions
of people, places and organizations. To check whether or not
an email is autogenerated, we used a simple heuristic to check
whether or not an email contains ‘Unsubscribe.’ Meeting fea-
tures describe the meeting instance, and include details such
as the number of attendees, and whether a person’s manager
is in attendance. Organizational relationships were computed
by cross referencing the attendee information from the cal-
endar and the company’s organizational chart as follows: for
each attendee, we checked whether or not the attendee was
the person’s manager, direct report, above or below the org
chart. Finally, we include one hybrid feature which counts the
number of meeting attendees mentioned in the email.
Results
We sought to replicate the analyses we conducted in the ex-
ploratory retrospective survey, when possible. As we will
show, the consistency of their results helps bolster our con-
fidence in their validity and reliability. Now, we discuss our
main findings of this study.
Participants
In total, we received 1,040 meeting-email pairs labeled by 169
participants. Similar to the retrospective survey, job roles were
10 Uncomfortable Mixed Comfortable 10 Comfortable
Labeled meeting-email pairs 23% 36% 41%
Retrospective survey (work) 17% 36% 47%
Retrospective survey (personal) 40% 35% 25%
Table 2. Distribution of three groups of respondents in both the retrospective and contextual-labeling study. “10 Uncomfortable” indicates respondents
who labelled all 10 emails as uncomfortable, “10 Comfortable” indicates respondents who labelled all 10 emails as comfortable, and “Mixed comfortable”
indicates respondents who reported a mixture of both comfortable and uncomfortable emails.
diverse. The largest two categories included software develop-
ers (21.3%) and program managers (13.6%). An additional 52
individuals (30.8%) occupied various roles including: market-
ing managers, attorneys, sales specialists, business planners,
etc. Finally, the job roles of 58 participants (34.3%) were
filtered by k-anonymization.
In addition to collecting job demographics, the labeling tool
collected general measurements of the participants’ calendars
and email inboxes. For performance reasons, these coarse mea-
surements are constrained to examining users’ 300 most recent
emails, together with the last 7 days of their calendar. 75.15%
of participants’ inboxes contained fewer than 300 emails re-
ceived during this 7-day window (average: 103.7), allowing
a full measurement of email-meeting co-occurrences during
the week. These participants’ 7-day calendars contained an
average of 13.84 meetings (SD: 9.04). On average participants
received emails during 7.35 (53%) of these meetings (SD:
6.10). In other words, slightly more than half of all meetings
were interrupted by email.
A similar analysis can be performed for the remaining 24.85%
who received more than 300 emails. Here, the results cover
a variable time frame that is necessarily shorter than a week.
For these participants, their most recent 300 inbox emails co-
occurred with an average of 8.74 meetings (SD: 6.14). These
participants’ 7-days calendars contained an average of 18.83
meetings (SD: 11.66), suggesting that at least 46% of their
meetings are interrupted by email.
The remaining analysis considers specific email-meeting pairs
that are sampled from participant’s calendars and email in-
boxes. Unlike the above-mentioned aggregate measures, the
sampling procedure is not constrained by the 7-day, 300-email,
limit.
Prevalence of the information disclosure risk
As detailed in the procedure section, participants were asked
to answer questions about 10 email-meeting pairs. To generate
these pairs, we randomly sampled a meeting, then randomly
sampled an email received during the meeting. Mirroring
the analysis of the retrospective survey, 90 out of 169 people
(53.3%) had at least one email whose notification they rated as
uncomfortable sharing (i.e., they selected a comfort rating of
< 4 on the 7-point Likert scale for sharing the sender, subject
and first sentence of the email). This proportion is nearly
identical to that which was found in the retrospective survey
for emails delivered to work inboxes (53.4%, Figure 2).
Three groups of respondents
Earlier, when we analyzed the results of the retrospective sur-
vey, we observed that respondents could be bundled into three
groups based on how they rated their comfort levels in shar-
ing the notifications of their 10 most-recent emails with the
attendees of their most recent meeting. Now, in this labeling
study, participants were asked to label 10 emails known to
have actually arrived during 10 distinct meetings. This al-
lows a more ecologically valid analysis of this phenomenon.
Results are presented in Table 2, together with the distribu-
tion reported in our retrospective survey. The results show
that 23% of the respondents were uncomfortable sharing any
of 10 emails in the respective meetings (indicated under the
heading “10 Uncomfortable” in Table 2), while 41% of the
respondents were comfortable sharing all of the 10 emails (10
Comfortable in Table 2), and 36% of them were uncomfort-
able sharing some emails (“Mixed Comfortable” in Table 2).
Notably, the distribution of users is roughly consistent across
both the retrospective survey and the labeling tool (for work
inboxes). This suggests that, although the retrospective survey
involved a hypothetical situation, its findings closely match
those of real-world scenarios. The distribution of the groups
also resembles the classical trichotomy of the Westin Index;
but, again, we are sensitive to the fact that these preferences
can be highly nuanced and context-sensitive. To that end, we
explore contextual factors below, as well as later in the section
entitled “Predicting Comfort Level”.
Email and meeting properties
When reporting the results of the retrospective survey, we
examined various properties of emails and meetings that might
indicate, or themselves constitute, an information disclosure
risk. We now reexamine those criteria with data compiled
from this study.
Number of email recipients: In the retrospective survey, we
found that the number of people in an email’s recipient list
may influence users’ comfort levels in receiving notifications.
Specifically, we observed that the majority of HIDE emails
(62.9%) had only a single recipient. We can report a similar
statistic for data collected via the labeling tool but must first
filter the data such that they are directly comparable: In the
retrospective survey, users were asked to discuss the most
sensitive email from among those they would be uncomfort-
able sharing in a meeting. When we apply the same criteria
to label-tool data, we find that 46.8% of emails have only a
single recipient.
The labeled data also allows for a more deliberate examination
of this phenomenon. This is because it contains examples of
both sensitive and non-sensitive email-meeting pairs. Over
all 1040 pairs, 406 (39%) emails were delivered to a single
recipient (i.e., contains no other recipients in either the ‘to:’
or ‘cc:’ fields). For 131 (32.3%) of these emails, participants
indicated that they would be uncomfortable with meeting atten-
dees seeing the resultant email notifications. This number falls
to 23.2% for emails delivered to multiple individuals. This
difference is statistically significant (Z = 3.228, p = 0.001),
suggesting that, when multiple people are in an email thread,
the likelihood of the email containing sensitive or private in-
formation may be lower.
Number of external meeting attendees: Results from the
earlier retrospective survey also suggested that meeting at-
tendance might influence how comfortable people are with
sharing their email notifications3. Specially, the presence of
people outside of one’s team or organization might increase
levels of discomfort. Again, the labeled-data allows for a
more ecologically valid and sensitive analysis: Of the 1040
email-meeting pairs, 298 (27.8%) were attended by people
from outside of the organization.4 Participants reported that
in 95 cases (32.3%), they would be uncomfortable sharing
the email notification with meeting attendees. This proportion
falls to 24.4% for meetings in which all attendees are fellow
employees of the same organization. This difference is sta-
tistically significant (Z = 2.78, p = 0.005), suggesting that
meeting attendance may indeed influence comfort levels about
email notifications.
Together, these findings reinforce and extend our answers to
the first two research questions: people are often interrupted
by emails when in meetings, in a sizable minority of cases
people are uncomfortable sharing the resultant email notifi-
cations with the people in the room (RQ1). These levels of
discomfort may depend on individual characteristics, as well
as on features of the meetings and emails (RQ2). This, in turn,
hints at the possibility of using machine learning to predict
when email notifications pose an information disclosure risk.
We examine this in the next section, and, in doing so, answer
our final research question (RQ3).
PREDICTING COMFORT LEVEL
To further explore the problem space, we developed binary
classifiers that, given an email-meeting pair, decide if the deliv-
ery of an email notification would result in an uncomfortable
situation. In constructing these classifiers, we both: (1) gain
a deeper understanding of how combinations of user, email
and meeting features may contribute to one’s concerns about
email notifications, and (2) explore modeling decisions and
requirements that can lead to context-dependent predictions
accurate enough to be used to manage users’ notifications in
real-world settings. We address these goals below, with two
experiments.
Experiment 1: User-Stratified Classification
In our first experiment, we wish to better understand how
generic features of people, emails, and meetings impact one’s
comfort level in receiving email notifications during meetings.
3Results from the retrospective survey were not statistically sig-
nificant, but suggested a possible trend worth further investigation
(Figure 4).
4External to the organization via the numExternal feature. Note,
the organization chart used in the labeling tool was not sufficiently
fine-grained to determine if a fellow employee was a member of a
different team.
Classifier Features AUC Pr Re F1
St
ra
tifi
ed user 0.68 0.72 0.17 0.28
email + meeting 0.54 0.56 0.12 0.20
user + email + meeting 0.76 0.64 0.45 0.53
70
:3
0
user + email + meeting 0.85 0.71 0.62 0.66
Table 3. Results of the classifiers that predict if a respondent would
be comfortable revealing a given email notification in a particular meet-
ing context (i.e., an email-meeting pair). The top section reports results
when training and testing on data that is stratified such that no user ap-
pears in both collections (i.e., no opportunity for personalization). The
bottom section reports results arising when the training and test collec-
tions are split such that each user contibutes 7 training examples and 3
test examples (i.e., potential for weak personalization).
This experiment aligns with a cold-start scenario, where a
system has no prior labels for a given user. To accomplish this,
we stratify our training and evaluation sets such that no user
contributes labels to both sets.
To explore the feature space, we train 3 boosted tree ensemble
classifiers. We chose to experiment with tree-based classifiers
because they are often more interpretable, allowing us to better
learn about the design space and understand the importance
of features even in a non-linear decision boundary. The first
classifier relies only on features about the user (e.g., Table 1,
top). This model is context-independent, and does not depend
on the properties of meetings or emails. A second classifier
is trained on email and meeting features (Table 1, middle and
bottom). A third classifier is trained on all features.
For training and evaluation we use the 1040 labeled examples
collected in the second study, above. Training and evaluation
is done using 10-fold cross-validation, stratified by users, and
optimized to maximize the area under the receiver operating
characteristic curve (AUC).
Detailed results are presented in Table 3 (top, stratified). There
are a few points to note. First, given that the AUC > 0.5 in
all cases, all three classifiers perform better than chance –
though this is barely the case for the classifier that uses only
email + meeting features. Despite the weak performance of
the classifier using email + meeting features, the individual
features chosen by the model as informative aligns well with
our intuition and with observations from survey and labeled
data collection. This feature set contains: the number of
external meeting attendees, the number of people on an email’s
‘cc:’ line, mentions of money or finance in the mail body, and
the presence of negative emotion words in both the email
and meeting bodies (Table 4). The user features are more
informative than email + meeting features in predicting user
comfort, hinting to our observation about three groups of
respondents, which can potentially be predicted based on user
features such as their role, their rank in the organization and
communication patterns.
Although email + meeting features are weakly informative
alone, their combination with user features lead to larger pre-
dictive performance than each feature set achieves alone. We
present the relative importance of features in the combined
user email + meeting all 70:30 all
U.avgEmlPerMtg (1) M.numSubjectWords (1) U.numEmails (1) U.avgEmlPerMtg (1)
U.numMtgWithEml (0.78) M.numExternal (0.96) U.avgEmlPerMtg (0.97) U.numEmails (0.86)
U.orgDepth (0.39) E.numBodyWords (0.95) E.numBodyWords (0.9) U.numMtgWithEml (0.78)
U.numMeetings (0.36) E.LIWC[money] (0.83) E.numSubjectWords (0.82) M.orgChartAbove (0.73)
U.numEmails (0.35) E.entity[org] (0.79) E.LIWC[money] (0.79) E.LIWC[money] (0.7)
E.numCC (0.78) U.numMtgWithEml (0.77) M.LIWC[negemo] (0.62)
E.LIWC[negemo] (0.68) U.orgDepth (0.73) M.numSubjectWords (0.6)
E.attachment[png] (0.68) U.numMeetings (0.72) E.numBodyWords (0.58)
M.LIWC[negemo] (0.67) E.LIWC[posemo] (0.71) M.LIWC[posemo] (0.58)
E.numThreads (0.58) E.numThreads (0.7) U.numMeetings (0.58)
Table 4. Top 10 most informative features for classifiers trained on various feature sets: user, email + meeting, and all. The leftmost 3 columns show
results for the classifier trained on user-stratified data (no personalization). The rightmost column shows results for the full feature set, in the 70:30 split
condition (weak personalization). The number in the parentheses indicates the information gain, normalized such that the most informative feature
scores a 1.0. The prefixes ’U’, ’E’ and ’M’, denote user, email and meeting features, respectively.
model in the third column of Table 4. Here, we found that the
most informative features are related to how many emails a
user receives, and the average number of emails they receive
during a meeting. This aligns with our general intuition that
the more emails a user receives when they are in a meeting,
the greater risks they would be exposed to potential infor-
mation disclosure events. Likewise, and likely for the same
reasons, we find that the number of meetings interrupted by
email, and the total number of meetings attended per week are
also predictive of information disclosure risk. Another set of
informative features is related to email length. Specifically,
the length of the email subject and body, and the number of
emails in the email thread were found to be important. Finally,
we found that mentions of finance and instances of positive
emotion words were important features. This aligns with previ-
ous research suggesting that people are uncomfortable sharing
information in certain categories such as money [28].
Experiment 2: Personalization
Given the importance of user-level features above, we now
explore the gains that can be achieved by allowing the classifier
to learn from a user’s prior labels. Specifically, we retrain our
best performing model (user + email + meeting features), but
stratify the data such that, for each user, 7 labeled data points
are included in the training set, and 3 labeled data points are
included in the test split. This arrangement allows for a weak
form of personalization. We again use 10-fold cross-validation
for the evaluation.
Results are presented in the bottom row of Table 3 (70:30).
This model outperforms the previous best-performing model
by 12.0% (as measured by AUC). This result strongly argues
for the need to personalize models of notification information
disclosure risk. With our best performing model achieving a
precision of 0.71, and a recall of 0.62, the classifiers are likely
to be too weak useful in most high-risk applications. Never-
theless, our explorations reveal that generic features provide
some information about the information disclosure risks of an
email-meeting pair (i.e., this model does substantially better
than guessing).
Similar to Experiment 1, we also looked at the 10 most infor-
mative features with this classifier (the right most column in
Table 4). In addition to the user features that might be indica-
tive of potential exposure (the number of emails a user receives
in a week, the average emails per meeting, the number of meet-
ings), and email features that are related to email contents and
length, we found features related to meeting context. Notably,
the third most informative feature was one that counted how
many meeting attendees were above the recipient in the orga-
nizational chart. Again, we also found that people were more
uncomfortable sharing emails when the meeting description
contains strong negative or positive emotion words.
To this end, we have answered our research questions. In the
next section, we offer design implications, then conclude with
a brief discussion of limitations and future work.
DESIGN IMPLICATIONS
In this section, we discuss some of the implications for design-
ing contextually-relevant notification systems and policies.
Personalization matters. Both our exploratory retrospective
survey and the contextual labeling study revealed three general
and distinct groups of respondents. If a user can be quickly
characterized as Always Comfortable or as Always Uncomfort-
able, then the notifications policies are rather straightforward:
unconditionally allow all notifications for the unconcerned,
and turn off notifications for those Always Uncomfortable un-
less the system is certain the user is alone. However, there
exists a much richer strategy space for the Mixed Comfortable
group, where various notification actions can be designed by
hiding certain fields of messages, or delivering notifications
only to certain devices.
Even simple context is helpful. As discussed above, for
some people an effective notification policy might need only
know if a person is alone, and examining a user’s calendar
may serve as an acceptable approximation. Slightly more
sophisticated policies might instead consider whether an email
was delivered to multiple people, or whether a meeting will
be attended by people from outside the organization. These
possibilities make clear that interesting notification policies
can be developed from simple, easy-to-compute, signals.
Better sensing is likely to help. Both the retrospective survey
and the contextual-labeling study included questions that could
not be automatically answered based on calendar appointments
and emails alone. For example, we asked participants if they
actually attended meetings, and whether meetings were con-
ducted via teleconference. With richer sensing capabilities,
it is possible that these features too could be reasoned about
automatically.
Choose your notification fields wisely. Finally, our studies
revealed that certain notification fields are generally less sensi-
tive than others. However, these preferences weren’t universal,
and varied even within a single user’s responses. For example,
an email’s sender field may pose little risk in some cases (e.g.,
an email from a known collaborator), but pose significant risk
in others (e.g., an email from a particular medical specialist).
Systems should leverage these general trends and preferences,
but also be expressive enough to allow exceptions. In addition,
to better preserve user privacy while deciding which notifica-
tion fields to show, we not only need to take into consideration
the sensitivity of different notification fields in various context
and contents, but also need to use rather more conservative
notification strategies in disclosing information when there is
uncertainty in predicting comfort level.
DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
In this paper, we characterized information disclosure risks
that arise when people receive notifications in the presence of
others. Specifically, we focused on emails that arrive during
meetings. Our analysis employed multiple lines of evidence,
including one large retrospective survey, and data collected
in a second study via a purpose-built labeling tool. We report
similar trends in both datasets, and are encouraged by the
consistency of the findings.
Nevertheless, we caution readers against overgeneralizing our
findings. Both the survey and labeling tool were deployed
within a single large U.S.-based information technology com-
pany. Though respondents occupied a wide variety of job
roles, it remains to be demonstrated that our findings gener-
alize to other companies, company cultures, and industries.
For example, it seems likely that people working in financial,
legal, and medical industries may be more sensitive to infor-
mation disclosure risks. It is also possible that preferences
and concerns may vary by country and culture. Thankfully
the features we described in this paper are very general, and
are likely to be applicable in other companies and industry
settings. As such, we expect replication efforts to be rather
straightforward, and we both encourage and anticipate efforts
to replicate our findings in other industries and cultures.
Additionally, we would like to extend our analysis to personal
emails and contexts (e.g., social gatherings, appointments, etc).
The retrospective survey revealed that people perceive a higher
risk when personal emails arrive during work meetings. One
wonders: Is the same true for social gatherings? And, how
might work notifications be perceived in non-work contexts?
We believe this line of investigation will lead to fruitful future
research.
Likewise, our studies focused exclusively on email notifica-
tions. This choice was deliberate and practical; as noted in
the introduction, email is often a carrier for other types of
notifications (e.g., social networks), and by focusing on emails
we were able to build and deploy a labeling tool with minimal
effort. In the future, we hope to explore the privacy risks of
other notification types, including: instant messages, calendar
appointments, to-dos, personal reminders, and other informa-
tion proactively displayed by virtual assistants. Studying these
notifications will require deeper technical integration with
notification-capable devices and platforms.
Our studies were also exclusively performed from the perspec-
tive of the notification recipient. We recognize that the senders
of emails are also subject to disclosure risks. When such risks
are present, message originators can take some limited preven-
tive actions to mitigate risks (e.g., by indicating that an email
is private or sensitive in email subject, or by adding blank
lines to the beginning of a message). In the future, we hope to
investigate these aspects of the problem space and potentially
explore practices that can be shared across organizations to
mitigate such risks.
On a technical note, we also reflect on our limited success
in constructing a classifier for meeting-email pairs. As noted
earlier, our models were trained and tested on a total of 1040
labeled pairs. While this sample is large in the context of a
survey, and for reporting descriptive statistics, it is rather small
for state-of-the-art classifiers. This data scarcity is confounded
by the fact that labels within the dataset are likely correlated;
the 1040 labeled pairs represent only 169 individuals. In the
future, we hope to collect more data and improve prediction
accuracy to implement real-time notification-capable systems.
Finally, we recognize that there are costs to delaying notifi-
cations, or hiding notification fields [17, 19]. Our studies did
not measure these costs, and cannot directly experiment with
formal notification policies. Nevertheless, we feel our analy-
sis has showcased the need and opportunity to develop such
policies, and has provided strong hints about which features
and properties are likely to be informative.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we report results from an exploratory retrospec-
tive survey and a larger contextual labeling study. Our research
necessitated that we ask users to discuss sensitive scenarios.
Specifically, we asked user to describe sensitive emails, and
to discuss why they would feel uncomfortable receiving no-
tifications for those messages when in the presence of others.
To this end, we designed our studies to carefully respect par-
ticipant privacy, and we believe these considerations were
instrumental in allowing us to recruit a combined total of 300
individuals. From these individuals, we learned:
• (RQ1) Email notifications indeed pose an information dis-
closure risk.
• (RQ2) The real or perceived severity of these risks depend
both on user characteristics (e.g. the nature of occupation)
and attributes of the meeting or email (e.g., the number of
recipients or attendees).
• (RQ3) Machine-learned models can learn attributes, pat-
terns and signals associated with risky email-meeting pairs.
Here, user-level features are more informative than generic
meeting or email-level features. The best performing mod-
els incorporate all features, together with user history.
Taken together, our findings present a rich picture of notifica-
tions, as viewed through the lens of privacy. We hope that our
findings will inform the design of future notification-capable
systems.
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